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RESPONSIBILITY AND TECHNICS
IN LEVINAS AND JONAS
TWO STRATEGIES IN RESPONSE TO THE DISORIENTATION OF ETHICS IN THE MODERN WORLD
Ernst Wolff
In this essay I undertake a comparative study
on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Hans
Jonas.1 It is possible to approach such a compari-
son by discussing their philosophies primarily
from the perspective of the influence of their Ju-
daic heritage, in which elements of monotheism
and a concomitant religious ethics would be the
most central parts. What I present does not aim to
reject such a perspective, but instead provides an-
other perspective, which could be considered to
put comparisons from the former perspective in a
different light. I chose to pursue this line of en-
quiry because, regarding the issue of ethics, at the
center of both Levinas and Jonas’s philosophical
concern is the concession that, first, the non-reli-
gious philosophical diagnosis of contemporary
culture is to be taken very seriously and, second,
that if one is to respond to this crisis, it has to be
done, as far as possible, in terms of that secular
philosophy. In other words, I would argue that,
for both our authors, if one wishes to contemplate
what they, as philosophers, say about God and
ethics, this enquiry can be undertaken success-
fully only if one follows them in accepting the ex-
istence of the crisis which has been called nihil-
ism or the “death of God.” The ethics of
responsibility of which both speak (in their re-
spective ways) cannot be typified as simply a de-
rivative of a monotheism drawn into philoso-
phy—their ethics was formulated in response to
their recognition of the problem of the death of
God. This means that both philosophers implic-
itly propose to their readers as a criterion for the
success of their work not the fidelity with which
they can speak in Greek about the Hebrew God,
but the success with which they as philosophers
can respond to the crisis of the death of God, that
is, of nihilism.2
This perspective on Levinas and Jonas un-
folds neatly when one starts reading them, not, in
the first place, from the perspective of their Ju-
daic convictions, but from the perspective of their
acknowledged indebtedness to Heidegger.3 Both
Levinas and Jonas were won over very early to
the Heideggerian perspective on human exis-
tence as originally care.4 The analysis of Dasein
as a non-consciousness-centered access to our
being-in-the-world consists of two aspects that
are crucial to both Levinas and Jonas: to begin
with, the openness of human existence to the
world is one of practice, of I can, before I think;
and next, all meaning is derived from this fact. In
Heideggerian pragmatism,5 the range of human
action and the range of meaning are co-original.
But from this twin source, contemporary culture
develops in two important directions that pose
different kinds of problem to human existence.
On the one hand, the range of action is aug-
mented and changed in nature by the new techni-
cal means. On the other hand, there is increasing
recognition of the conviction that a variety of ac-
tions, whose meaning forms within culturally
specific contexts, do not allow for a unifying
point of reference that would enable judgment to
be passed on the value of these meanings; this is
to say that a window is opened on the so-called
death of God.
For philosophers who have been influenced
by Heidegger in some way, thinking about ethics
would have to include responding to a prolifera-
tion of meanings that lack any point of reference
for their validity. In the contemporary world, they
would have to be open to reflecting on the rele-
vance of a “resuscitated God” for people living in
the industrialized world.6
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In this essay, I undertake to show that this is
indeed the case with both Levinas and Jonas, and
to present a critical comparison of the different
ways in which they go about this task. This pro-
cedure will shed light on the work of both. The
comparative perspective that I develop here is
guided by the following three-fold concern: first,
to indicate how they interpret the crisis of the
death of God; second, to comment on how they
shift from that diagnosis to their justification of a
unifying point of orientation for action, in other
words, to compare their philosophies of respon-
sibility; and third, to clarify the position of the
context of the industrialised world—whence
both philosophers argue—in their respective phi-
losophies . After developing my perspective on
these two philosophical projects, I conclude with
a number of considerations that may be relevant
to future projects comparing the work of Levinas
and Jonas.
I would like to emphasize that I do not claim to
present an exhaustive discussion of the topics in-
dicated above, and even less a complete overview
of the two philosophies in question—for this a
proper monograph would be needed. However, I
hope that my essay will contribute to the launch-
ing of such a larger project and to greater under-
standing of Jonas and Levinas, by means of a
critical comparison.
The “Death of God” or Nihilism, and the
Opposing Orientation
Although both Levinas and Jonas are deeply
indebted to Heidegger, the task they undertook
required them to distance themselves from
Heidegger to some extent. The person that pro-
vides the “intellectual tools” to search for a solu-
tion also epitomizes the problem: Heidegger’s
philosophy might be that of a pagan (and calling
it thus implies that his position is still criticized in
theological terms), but much more significantly,
in his work the individual is abandoned to fate.7
However, their effort cannot be reduced to their
engagement in polemics with one person—it re-
flects their struggle with a broad cultural phe-
nomenon in which ethics has collapsed or risks
collapsing. Heidegger’s work seems merely to
give privileged access to this broader phenome-
non.
Disorientation
For Jonas the fate that humans are abandoned
to implies an ethical void. This nihilism may have
an important precursor in ancient Gnosticism,
but has reached its zenith in the twentieth cen-
tury: “That nature does not care, one way or the
other, is the true abyss. That only man cares, in
his finitude facing nothing but death, alone with
his contingency and the objective meaningless-
ness of his projecting meanings, is a truly unprec-
edented situation.”8 ()—thus Jonas summarizes
the crisis of nihilism in his famous criticism of
Heidegger (in “Gnosticism, Existentialism, and
Nihilism.”9
Jonas identified three important aspects of ni-
hilism.10 First, whereas in previous eras people’s
lives were oriented by their devout obedience to
God, as the Creator of a world order that lends it-
self to people’s orienting their existence to it, in
an era of nihilism, people float around meaning-
lessly, as specks in the inhumanly large expanse
of the universe. Thus they are subject to the re-
lentless becoming of a universe that follows un-
conscious laws towards a future that has no de-
monstrable end or purpose.11 Second, even in
their insignificant earthly existence, people’s
conduct is at the mercy of the urges of natural
drives and the whims of superegos and other
forces that spend themselves on human beings
and that preclude divine direction. What remains
of guiding values is a multitude of relative, con-
text-determined or interest-informed notions,
without ultimate reference. Deprived of a means
to give order to this chaos, human beings ironi-
cally have to take the positions of both judging
between these values and overseering their real-
ization. Third, the calamity of this situation is ex-
acerbated by modern technology, which
strengthens human capacity to act on a hitherto
undreamt of scale. The height of this newly ac-
quired strength is the capability to intervene in
the very processes by which the essence of
human beings is determined and by which
human beings are formed (notably in bio-
technology).
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This summary of nihilism, as Jonas sees it,
should sound familiar to readers of Levinas. Be-
ing fatefully chained to history is the most promi-
nent image that Levinas, since Quelques
réflextions sur la philosophie de l’hitlérisme
(1934) and De l’évasion (1935), uses to describe
his problem in philosophy.12 If it is true that, as
Heidegger argued, human existence is ontologi-
cally characterized by care (Sorge), this implies
that every aspect of (human) existence has al-
ready been entrusted to or surrendered to the
“brutal” flux of being that draws it along blindly.
This means that “the essence of the human being
is no longer in freedom, but in a kind of enslave-
ment [enchaînement]” (IH 30).
It is only a small step from being subjected to
this fate to accepting it. Levinas argues that “ev-
ery civilization that accepts being, the tragic de-
spair that it entails and the crimes that it justifies,
deserves the name of barbaric” (EV 127). The
first kind of “human fiasco” associated with the
heroic assumption of the “act of being” (accord-
ing to the terms of DVI 80) is to be found in the
political catastrophes in which the particularity
of vulnerable individuals is mercilessly subju-
gated to systems of totalitarian power. Ironically,
by taking cognizance of the first kind of human
fiasco, people are overwhelmed by the impo-
tence of humanity to give an orientation to life.13
This in turn engenders the second kind of hu-
man fiasco: the loss of any affirmation of the pos-
sibility of orientation, in other words, succumb-
ing to the despair of human life as a mere
arbitrary element in the play of passions, and
contingently constituted meaning. Philosophy
and the humanities in general reflect this loss of
orientation by their anti-Platonic structure,
which entails a non-reducible plurality of cul-
tural expressions and values, without ultimate
orientation, which is often referred to as the
“death of God” and what Levinas calls “the crisis
of monotheism” (HH 40) and the plurality of
contingent values. Any discourse that claims to
represent or to have access to the ultimate and au-
thoritative vocabulary or point of orientation,
is—according to Levinas’s reading of the main
trend in contemporary reflection—nothing more
than one amongst the multitude of historically
constituted, culturally specific forms of mean-
ing-giving or valuation that, furthermore, ignores
its own finitude and situatedness. In the absence
of any measure for judging cultural expressions,
one floats inevitably in the sea of an indifferent
plurality of expressions.14
Orientation
However, when one considers the two philos-
ophers’ responses to this crisis of disorientation,
especially with regard to ethics, the difference
between their positions is striking.
Jonas attempts to argue that the cosmos is not
as indifferent as modern science would have it.
The centre of his argument is a careful re-exami-
nation of the body (PL 19). This leads to an exis-
tential reading of the organism (PL ix) in which
the Heideggerian notion of care is spread across
all life: all life is suspended between birth and
death, but this is a tension marked by care and the
attempt to persevere in the living existence. Once
this has been argued, it can be claimed (contrary
to what nihilism, according to Jonas, entails) that
nature does, in fact, care. And it is in the care of
nature that the essence of ethicity is inscribed.
Ontologically speaking, “in purposiveness as
such . . . we can see a fundamental self-affirma-
tion of being, which posits it absolutely as the
better over against nonbeing. . . . The mere fact
that being is not indifferent toward itself makes
its difference from nonbeing the basic value of all
values, the first ‘yes’ in general” (PV 155/IR
81).15 Jonas believes that with this notion of the
non-indifferent concern of nature for being, this
natural teleology, he has acknowledged the enor-
mous basis that is the “iceberg of our being, i.e.,
‘the broad organic basis on which the miracle of
mind is perched’” (PE xii) by recognizing in it
the conditions for a general intelligibility of care
for life. Human beings, who are thus rehabili-
tated as the reflecting part of a caring organic life,
would again be capable of engaging in ethical re-
flection and action.16
It would be difficult to conceive of a less
Levinasian way to deal with the problem. For
Levinas, at best, nature forms the décor in which
humans act ethically or unethically toward one
another. Very often, however, nature is the do-
main—phenomenologically described—of the
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sacred as the numinous, the playground for and
toys of capricious gods that terrorize defenseless
human beings; it is the setting for the cruel strug-
gle for survival (cf. TI 151). Nature, as it infil-
trates the most intimate or hidden life of the indi-
vidual, is that from which escape is needed; the
conatus in suo esse perseverandi (Spinoza) is the
human expression of being under the force of na-
ture and living at the expense of others. One
could argue that Levinas wants to posit precisely
that we as humans are not only our nature (or to
put it differently, although human beings are an
identifiable form of biological existence), there is
something “non-nature” in humans that is ulti-
mately significant about human beings and that is
decisive for our understanding of ethics. Typical
of his argument is the duality of ageing (curi-
ously enough, another attentive interpretation of
the body):17 whilst ageing undeniably demon-
strates the perseverance of an individual in his/
her being, it is at the same time, enigmatically,
also a giving away of life. According to Levinas,
it is a giving away that is directed at the other,
submitted to the judgment of the advantage of the
other (cf. AE 87–90). It is exactly the other in
whose presence I live who makes it possible for
me to transcend my own being, who gives my ex-
istence a more than ontological meaning, that is,
an ethical meaning. It is by having one’s entire
existence directed as a response to the appeal em-
anating from the other that human existence is
oriented, and that the value of whatever
culturally specific forms of expression there are
can be judged according to the fidelity with
which they respond to the appeal of the other.
The consequence of these divergent responses
to the problem of nihilism is an important contra-
diction that emerges from the work of Jonas and
Levinas. Despite Jonas’s strong effort to the con-
trary, for Levinas, Jonas’s thought will remain in
harmony with the deepest origin of nihilism,
since it does not succeed in thinking of the mean-
ing of human existence as beyond being or na-
ture;18 but, conversely, to Jonas, Levinas would
appear nihilist, since the human subject, even
face to face with the other, remains isolated from
the organic basis in which it is implanted and
from which its caring intervention in human af-
fairs draws its intelligibility.19
In view of this conclusion, the agreement be-
tween the two authors on the ethical evidence re-
garding parenthood may strike us as surprising.
For Jonas, parenthood provides the unmistakable
archetype of the ethical imperative that is dic-
tated by nature; for Levinas, parenthood, despite
the natural propagation of the identity of the par-
ent in the child, testifies to an unmistakable
alterity (of the child with regard to the parent)
that stamps the subject with an ethical obligation
(cf. TA 85–87). However, since the position of
their respective reflections on this subject needs
to be carefully situated within the historical de-
velopment of their work, for the moment I limit
my observations to pointing out that they agree
that the theoretical reduction of everything to is,
to being, with the subsequent exclusion of ought,
is not legitimate (PV 234–36). The finer qualifi-
cations of this “beyond is” are the focus of the
next section.
The Principle of Ethicity, The Principle of
Responsibility
Despite their widely divergent orientations,
Jonas and Levinas concur in significant respects
on the idea of ethicity, which they developed
from these orientations.20
My comparison in this regard is complicated
somewhat by the fact that I share the reading of a
number of commentators on Jonas (not the least
of which is Jonas himself, in his last essays) that
consider his metaphysical project as having
failed.21 However, I believe that a more flattering
(although not completely unproblematic) read-
ing of Jonas’s work is possible, using his non-
philosophical, non-theological myth as a point of
entry to his work on responsibility.22 Since I think
that such a reading of Jonas opens up a number of
additional avenues of exploration in comparing
his work with that of Levinas, I first outline this
reading. In comparing the work of Jonas and
Levinas regarding issues related to the justifica-
tion of responsibility, I clearly indicate when a
point of comparison touches upon Jonas’s nor-
mal, metaphysical foundation of ethics, or the
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
130
mythological justification in my unorthodox re-
reading thereof.
In essence, the Jonassian myth (PL 275ff.;
PUV 193ff.) concerns a creator God who, after
the creation, not only left the entire creation to it-
self, but with it left his (her?) own being to cre-
ation. It is through the long process of the forma-
tion of consciousness in life and later self-
consciousness in humanity that the divine comes
to self-experience.23 This entails taking an enor-
mous risk, since it means that in reality it is the
creatures that henceforth decide the image of the
Creator. This God never intervenes in history, but
Jonas suggests that this God lets his/her shadow
and light of disapproval and approval fall on
human action.
Now, I have argued that this myth—a com-
pletely different genre of discourse from Jonas’s
metaphysics—in fact realizes the same intention
as Jonas’s metaphysical-ethical project (summa-
rized above). This correspondence between
Jonas’s philosophical project and his myth can be
schematized in the following manner:
Philosophical Project Myth
1 Construction of a philosophical
ethics after the “death of God”
God recedes after creating the
world
2 Human beings are part of
broader natural being
Human beings develop out of a
process of evolution
3 Spirit has an organic basis God becomes self-conscious-
ness, ultimately, in the human
spirit
4 Care is imbedded in the totality
of life
Care for life is a reaction to the
threat of life
5 Affirmation of life is the begin-
ning of ethics, which culmi-
nates in human responsibility
Human beings are capable of
affirming good against evil
6 Human beings respond to the
categorical imperative of care
for life
Human beings take responsi-
bility for the image of God
This myth is not a forceful and binding argu-
ment; but unlike Jonas’s metaphysics, it takes the
philosophical tradition’s criticism of metaphys-
ics seriously—it takes human finitude seriously.
It is not an irreplaceable narrative; it serves to
evoke an idea, after which the myth itself be-
comes redundant. As such, it works aestheti-
cally:24 instead of providing us with a foundation
of ethics, it describes the originary ethical mood
of existence; the myth describes not humanity,
but human being-in-the-world.
This myth, then, uses an image presented in
narrative form to evoke the largest possible con-
text of interpretation of all current facts and ac-
tions; it is only if such a context for the appear-
ance of the problem is accepted that the world
appears not merely as a given, but also as a prob-
lem. The first place in which the problematic na-
ture of the world is noted is the subjective, emo-
tional registration thereof, namely in the fear
evoked by the possibility of the destruction of hu-
manity. Human beings are more than agents of
efficiency, because they are capable of a kind of
fear in which they show themselves capable of
recording the judgment of (the receding) God.25
It is here that the other as the ethically other takes
possession of me in my capability to take respon-
sibility for the other (PV 166). Furthermore,
since this fear of the death of the other is not
merely “pathological,” but is indeed selfless and
directed at the advantage of (other) people (PV
392),26 it can activate the human agent to make
the transition from being affected by the vulnera-
bility of the other in fear to searching for an ap-
propriate response by means of a heuristics of
fear.27 Guided by the heuristics of fear, the ethical
subject responds to the appeal of the other, in
obedience to the categorical imperative of
respect for the life of the other (PV 36).
A whole series of terms and ideas from this
rendering of Jonas’s philosophy of the principle
of responsibility should strike readers of Levinas
as familiar: the otherness28 of the other, which
touches the subject as the mortality and vulnera-
bility of the other (cf. AT 147; IH 179), imposes a
relation of non-reciprocity or asymmetry (cf. PV
177f.;29 DEHH 174; EI 91) that is of ethical char-
acter. It is through this heteronomical imposition
of an obligation that the subject’s autonomy ac-
quires its true significance (PV 170; DMT 226).
Also, for both philosophers, responsibility char-
acterizes the entire life of the subject as a re-
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sponse to the appeal of the other and as a disinter-
ested obedience (or disobedience) to the prohibi-
tion against the murder of the other (PV 186; TI
258; DMT 132), exercised in anxiety about the
death of the other (DVI 256). This appeal (PV
162, 393, PUV 143; TI 238, EI 83), however, is
not an empirical phenomenon, but, as Levinas
presents it, refers to the enigma of the other that
exists in the trace of an ever-receding God/illeity
(DEHH 214).30 The “receptor” of the appeal is
the ethical agent that contracts the obligation of
responsibility passively (EI 89) and ironically
remains inadequate to meet the responsibility
which he/she is called on to take (PV 393).
Although there are remarkable similarities in
the justifications of the philosophies of responsi-
bility developed by Jonas and Levinas, the argu-
ment takes a different form in their writings:
Jonas argues a collective ethics encompassing
humanity as a whole, including generations to
come and even nature; Levinas claims that every
person has an obligation to his/her neighbor, ex-
panding gradually to cover all living humans.31
Other important similarities (with their respec-
tive differences in nuance and approach) are
explained in the subsections below.
Responsibility as ethicity: Although for
Levinas, responsibility is conceived of from the
perspective of the ethical response due to the
other, and for Jonas responsibility is the name of
ethics in the modern technical civilization (as is
clear especially from his task description in PV
Ch 1), for both, responsibility is the nature of the
ethical as such (for Jonas, this is clear from his
metaphysical foundation of ethics).32 The bulk of
their philosophical energy is consecrated to the
justification of the ethical as such and not to more
practical indications of what is to be done or to be
avoided. However, in Jonas’s Technik, Medizin
und Ethik, Jonas comes closer to the “praxis of
the principle of responsibility” than Levinas does
in his work.
Saying the unsayable: Provided that one ac-
cepts my “mythological” reading of Jonas, both
authors could be seen as post-metaphysical
thinkers. Their ethics is not based on an ontology
(this argument would obviously not apply in the
usual reading of Jonas); it is an ethics of human
finitude. However, some form of exegesis (of the
alterity of the other, in Levinas’s case; of being
affected by the other in fear, in Jonas’s case) is re-
introduced in order to save their philosophy from
ethical muteness: Levinas speaks of testimony or
prophecy—that event by which “I make myself
the author of what I hear” (DVI 124). Jonas sug-
gests that when we are affected by the other and
know why we are affected in this way, this being-
affected is not merely “pathological”. This
means that both authors are obliged to commit
what Levinas calls an “indiscretion with regards
to the unsayable” (AE 19): the biggest part of
Levinas’s philosophy falls into this category, as
does Jonas’s myth when it is understood as an
aesthetic evocation of the quality of human
being-in-the-world (as argued above).
Claim to a non-contingent interpretation of
the highest imperative: But this indiscretion is
taken furthe, when Jonas is obliged to make a
distinction between fear as a “pathological” re-
sponse to the world and fear as the very first read-
ing or recording of the meaning of the vulnerabil-
ity of the other (PV 166). He, like all other ethical
subjects, therefore has no other choice than to be-
come the spokesperson for the God that has with-
drawn completely from creation. The same holds
for the Levinasian prophet in whose stead no-
body can decide how to respond correctly to the
appeal of the other. Both philosophers have thus
claimed some capability for providing an exege-
sis of a supposed speech of a God that never ap-
pears. Both claim to be obliged to pronounce an
ethical message that cannot (fully) have its origin
and final expression in any cultural, historically
contingent interpretation of responsibility.
Responsibility as reinterpretation of the zoon
logon echon: For both philosophers, the inalien-
able imperative of responsibility decisively de-
fines human being. Whereas Jonas merely claims
that bearing responsibility belongs as much to
being human as being gifted with speech (cf. PV
185), Levinas argues for the radically passive
constitution of the subject of responsibility by the
“language” of the appeal of the other, which
stamps the subject with the quality of “saying”
(dire), or as Levinas says, is a sign for the other
(AE 83). For Jonas, it suffices to state that being
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human is being responsible, but Levinas insists
on the distinction or even separation of human re-
sponsibility from human animality (EN 161).
But for both Levinas and Jonas, responsibility
is not only the name of ethicity as such, but also
the name for the obligation that has to be realized
in relation to other people. A number of further
details of the relation between the authors need to
be developed on this point.
Responsibility and love: In his earlier philoso-
phy, Levinas shied away from the use of the word
“love” for the ethical relation (since love exists,
according to him, between two people only and
thus the social aspect of ethics would be ne-
gated—cf. EN 30–31—or it retains a quality of
seduction—AS 77), but he later approved of its
use, provided that one understands love as “with-
out concupiscence” and as referring to the tran-
scendence of ethics (DMT 255–57). Philosophy
even becomes the wisdom of love for him. For
Jonas, love is responsibility practiced to the point
of self-sacrifice (PV 175); however, he seems to
be less interested in self-sacrifice to the point of
saintliness than Levinas is.
Responsibility for the other’s responsibility:
The extent of the implications of the notion of re-
sponsibility is intensified when one considers
that, for both authors, responsibility means de-
ciding not only how to take care of the other, but
also how to take care of the responsibility of the
other (PV 89; EI 96). The other has to be taken
care of also in the sense of helping or correcting
the other in remaining responsible, but this would
necessarily mean being responsible for the terms
in which the ethical subject interprets the voice of
“God”. Whereas for Levinas the responsibility
for the responsibility of the other implies primar-
ily a movement or a constant call to greater vigi-
lance to the task of responsibility, for Jonas, the
emphasis is on the conditions of there being such
a thing as a human being capable of bearing re-
sponsibility and being responsible (cf. PV 186),
conditions that are under threat in the current
technological system.
Conflated structure of responsibility: (1) Let it
be assumed here that the very idea of responsibil-
ity implies (in its common use, at least) three as-
pects (the subject of responsibility, the domain of
responsible action and the authority in the face of
which one has to answer for one’s actions).
Micha Werner has argued compellingly that
Jonas conflates the authority of responsibility
and the domain of responsibility.33 This is clear in
the matter of responsibility for future genera-
tions. The same conflation is found in Levinas’s
notion of responsibility: the other for whom the
subject is responsible is always also the authority
to whom the subject is obliged to answer for the
ways the subject has adopted in responding to the
appeal of the other. While the exact rationale for
this conflation is not entirely clear to me, it cer-
tainly has the effect of supporting an understand-
ing of responsibility as not dependent and limited
by culture-specific institutions and ways of
justifying action. (2) Furthermore, it should be
noted that both Jonas and Levinas connect inti-
mately causal responsibility with ethical respon-
sibility.34 This is a result of identifying responsi-
bility with ethicity as such and imbuing the entire
human existence and scope of action with the
quality of responsibility. The problem with this
intimate connection is how to limit this responsi-
bility once it has been affirmed. This is the prob-
lem of the transition from ethics to politics.
Responsibility, politics, justice: The two phi-
losophers share the conviction that individually
borne responsibility should lead to political ac-
tion (Jonas’s emphasis) or action aimed at a poli-
tics of improving justice (Levinas’s emphasis).
However, Jonas insists that for a responsible per-
son who enters the domain of political action,
prospective responsibility requires collective,
that is, political action. This seems to impose it-
self on subjects, since the individual agent is
helpless in the face of the magnitude of the prob-
lems posed by the technological era. By contrast,
Levinas’s political thinking is based on the hy-
per-individualist isolation of the ethical subject
that nobody can replace, neither in his/her obli-
gation for the others, nor in deciding what the re-
alization of that obligation entails in practice.
Any valid collective action remains a derivative
of the individual realization of justice by individ-
uals. Jonas and Levinas’s perspectives probably
do not preclude one another, but an articulation
of the precise nature of their complementarity
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(and the limits thereof) would have to be the sub-
ject of another study.35
Technics and the Death of God
One could present the thought of both Levinas
and Jonas from the perspective of their fear of an
unfolding of history in which ethics would come
to an end, in which there would be no differentia-
tion between good and bad, that is, the dawning
of an era of indifference in which God would be
dead. It is well known that Jonas saw this threat
particularly in the historically unprecedented de-
velopments of contemporary technology. It is a
complex threat, since it is not only the misuse of
technology that could have disastrous conse-
quences; apparently good applications of tech-
nology could have them too (WpE 28). By con-
trast, Levinas sees the threat of generalised
indifference as lying in the divergent forms of
tyranny—and believes that violence lurks even in
states that function perfectly well36—but he is
also anxious about the ambiguous promise of
technology, even if he only rarely notes this con-
cern. Let us consider Jonas and Levinas in turn to
clarify this matter and to show why this threat
should be considered central in a study compar-
ing their work.
If we reconsider the three elements responsi-
ble for contemporary nihilism that Jonas identi-
fies, it is clear that the third—modern technol-
ogy—is the one that is most important to him. Or
to be more precise, it is this that occupies the larg-
est part of his later work, whereas his response to
the first element of nihilism—the absence of
God—is presented in The Phenomenon of Life
and concluded in Das Prinzip Verantwortung.
(Jonas neglects the second element of nihilism
somewhat.37 One could argue that in his approach
to nihilism, he is implicitly convinced that once
the other two elements have been resolved, hu-
man reason would be able to give some guide-
lines that could give some form of order to the
chaos of human values. Such a reason would be
able to give guidelines—or even draw up a
casuistics—around which tolerably different
cultural specific values could be rearranged.)
These two issues are intimately linked: a certain
vision of nature and a certain vision of instru-
mentality imply one another. What does this
mutual implication entail?
Without entering into the details of Jonas’s
theory of modern technology (see especially PV
ch. 1), it is essential to understand the position of
a reflection about technology in Jonas’s work,
which is deeply concerned with the vulnerability,
not only of nature, but also, and especially, of hu-
manity. The issue of technology is not incidental
to this author; it is not merely one domain among
many in which he applies pre-established ethical
principles. Modern technology follows in the
wake of the crisis of (Western) dualism, a crisis
that has been in existence for two thousand years,
in which human beings have become detached
from the value-structure inscribed in the very fi-
ber of nature. From this perspective, modern
technology coincides historically with the death
of God and shares the same origin. Furthermore,
modern technology has changed the givens of the
human condition in such a manner as to render all
previous ethics obsolete, at least with regard to
some of the most pressing contemporary ques-
tions, as many of these problems are themselves a
result of the development of technology in the
modern era (cf. PV 31, 57).38
For Levinas, technics is also associated with a
certain “death of God,” but in a completely differ-
ent way. The part of human existence that we call
technical capability is what first made it possible
to start freeing human beings from the hold that
nature had on them. As such, the emergence of
technics in the life of humans as a biological spe-
cies is intimately linked to the capability to
relativize the effect of human beings’ merciless
exposure to the elements, which was for a long
time experienced and expressed as the reign of
the capricious gods. Technics could be consid-
ered a human capability that is inherently secu-
larising, since, in this sense, technics infringes on
the domain of the gods. Therefore the emergence
of technics could be considered to announce the
death of religious gods. And this is not only a
phenomenon of modernity—its roots are to be
found in antiquity.39
However, this argument does not hold for the
God of the “monotheism” that Levinas wants to
rehabilitate in philosophy (which is not simply
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the monotheism of Judaism). This God is com-
pletely out of reach of technology; in fact,
technics should be considered (as I stated in the
introduction) an extension of the human I can;
the God of Levinas’s philosophical “monothe-
ism” is, however, not contaminated by being (AE
x).40 If this is then the status that Levinas accords
God and technics, it means that the entire domain
of human technicity falls in the category of the
existence of the subject, that is, the domain of
possibilities of reacting to the appeal of the other.
If this argument is accepted, one has to conclude
that, for Levinas, technics in itself is ethically in-
different—its ethical importance lies in its being
a force that liberates human beings from the or-
der of nature and allows them to act as ethical
agents,41 but otherwise technics has ethical sig-
nificance only in so far as it is embedded in one or
another project of response to the other.
In the few texts that Levinas devoted to
technics, this does indeed appear to be the case.42
The technical development of humanity, particu-
larly since the dawn of modernity, is inscribed in
a double dialectics. First, the same technology
that makes it possible, now more than ever be-
fore, to feed the hungry is also responsible for the
destruction of the environment in which people
are to live. Second, the same technics that makes
the modern state with its human rights and their
implementation possible could make it possible
to trample on those rights and oppress the citi-
zens. Ultimately, everything depends on the way
in which technics is incorporated into the exer-
cise of realizing justice in the face of the appeal of
the other. In this sense, the appeal of the other, in
combination with the ethical subject’s responses
to it, determines how technics should be
evaluated.
Conclusion
If Heidegger was convinced that rigorous
philosophical thought is serious reflection about
being, Jonas and Levinas decentered this onto-
logical concern in favor of an ethical concern.
“Decentering” ontology does not mean invalidat-
ing reflection on it, but rather continuing to pur-
sue thought about being in the service of another
concern, in this case, concern about the ethical.
Both these authors’redirection of Leibniz’s ques-
tion, “Why is there anything at all rather than
nothing?” is telling in this regard.
For Jonas this question remains nonsensical
and inevitably falls into an infinite regress as long
as the “why?” is to be answered by a “causal
whence?” (cf. PV 99). However, the question re-
tains its importance when the “why?” is an-
swered by a normative justification. “Why is
there something?” should be answered by a justi-
fication of the value of the existence of this some-
thing. Hence the question should be reformu-
lated: whatever the causal grounds for the
existence of things may be, why ought existence
to have priority over nothingness? (cf. PV 99). It
is the question concerning this ought that takes
centre stage in philosophy and (as far as Jonas’s
metaphysics is concerned) will lead to the claim
that this normative justification should be situ-
ated in the phenomenon of life, since “every liv-
ing being is its own end, without any need for fur-
ther justification” (PV 184). Obeying the
imperative implied in such a justified end is the
essence of Jonas’s ethics.43
Levinas remains convinced that the entire hu-
man being is ontology (cf. EN 13), even while he
exerts himself to show that the meaning of being
human should not be reduced to the ontological.
The decisive question is this: What is the place
that I take in being? And at whose expense do I
hold that place (cf. AT 180)? And this is, accord-
ing to Levinas, the first question concerning the
meaning of being—not the ontological question
about being (“Why is there something rather than
nothing?”), but the question of the justice or eth-
ics of being (“Do I have the right to be?” or “Is my
existence justified?”) (cf. DVI 257). Haunted by
this question, one would then live in such a man-
ner as to sacrifice or suspend, as it were, one’s
own existence and to live “as if one is not a being
amongst the beings” (cf. EI 97).
This article has attempted to explore a number
of points in which the efforts of Jonas and
Levinas to ethically decenter the question con-
cerning being overlap—whether they concur or
differ on these points. I am confident that this ar-
ticle makes a contribution to the existing research
on Levinas and Jonas, yet, it remains only a step
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towards an urgently needed in-depth study on
Jonas and Levinas—not only for the sake of the
clarification that it would give concerning their
respective projects, but especially for the under-
standing that it could bring in respect of their
philosophical concerns. In conclusion, I would
like to enumerate a few points that my work in the
current article suggests regarding the require-
ments for such a larger comparison between
Levinas and Jonas. The following seems to me to
be indispensable for such a project:
1. Consideration should be given to the theo-
ries of secularization and modernity proposed by
Levinas and Jonas and these theories should be
submitted to critical scrutiny. The nature of the
technological system would obviously take an
important position in such a study. Not only
should the current state of globalization be taken
into account, but the current state of social and in-
stitutional technologies should be given due con-
sideration. These social and institutional technol-
ogies are especially important for a realistic
assessment of the current situation and the capa-
bility of people to bear responsibility. Also, the
current state of secularization should be
questioned in relation to the two philosophies.
2. A number of issues relating to the core issue
of responsibility in Levinas and Jonas need to be
examined. First, the relation between responsi-
bility as the very nature of the ethical, or of
ethicity, and the practice of responsibility as a
form of ethics should be clarified. Second, the
structure of responsibility needs clarification—
this is especially true for the question of collec-
tive responsibility. Third, the relation between re-
sponsibility and other forms of ethics, and other
discourses on praxis, in particular politics and
technology, have to be unraveled. Fourth, the re-
lation between humanity and nature as beneficia-
ries of responsibility has to be considered. In my
opinion, all of this should be done in such a way
as to respect the immediate, local ethical engage-
ment of individuals, but at the same time the
global condition of contemporary human
existence should remain the ultimate horizon of
such reflection.
3. The articulation between all of the previous
points and the continued (benevolent and harm-
ful) existence of religion and theology should be
examined. Not only should Jonas’s and Levinas’s
own views on this articulation be considered, but
also the way in which this issue is contextualized
in current debates on the issue.
4. The appropriate philosophical discourse(s)
to be adopted in reflecting on ethics and on the
ethics of responsibility in particular should be re-
flected on. Such a reflection, which would take
the contributions of Jonas and Levinas as its point
of departure, would require a detailed compari-
son between their philosophical discourses and
that of Heidegger. This reflection would ulti-
mately involve investigating the question of the
relation between conflicting claims about what
the appropriate manner is to think the ethical in
continental philosophy and beyond. One could,
for instance, consider the tension between such
divergent thinkers as Karl-Otto Apel (who, in his
later work on responsibility, explicitly seeks to
extend some of Jonas’s concerns by means of his
version of discourse ethics)44 and Jean-François
Lyotard (in whose central work on ethics essen-
tial aspects of Levinas’s thought are taken over
and adjusted to Lyotard’s own project).45
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1. Reading Jonas and Levinas, one is struck, not only by
the obvious similarities and interesting convergences
between the two authors, but also by the relative scar-
city of studies that compare them and the fact that
these studies remain on an exploratory level. In this
essay, I attempt to expand the possibilities of such a
comparison. Given the limited scope of an article of
this nature, I am forced to refer to my own studies on
Jonas and Levinas frequently—not as an exercise of
conceited narcissism, but to support numerous
points of analysis of the respective philosophers and
secondary literature on them that cannot be repeated
here. An account is given of the existing work com-
paring Jonas and Levinas in the footnotes, with the
explicit objective of providing the reader with an
overview of the existing literature in this field of en-
quiry. I would like to argue that the current article ei-
ther corrects or supplements these existing studies.
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The following abbreviations are used for in-text cita-
tions: For Jonas: PL: The Phenomenon of Life: To-
ward a Philosophical Biology (Chicago/London:
University of Chicago Press, 1966); PE: Philosophi-
cal Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological
Man (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1974); PV: Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch
einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, [1979]1984);
WpE: Wissenschaft als persönliches Erlebnis
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987); and
PUV: Philosophische Untersuchungen und
metaphysische Vermutungen (Frankfurt-am-Main/
Leibzig: Insel Verlag, 1992). The books are referred
to in the language in which they first appeared. For
Das Prinzip Verantwortung, I used the translation
entitled The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search
of an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago/
London: University of Chicago Press, 1984)—ab-
breviated as IR. The page numbers refer first to the
page in the German text and then to the page in the
English translation; for references without quota-
tions, the page numbers refer to the German text,
where that is the original and first publication. For
Levinas: EV: De l’évasion (Montpellier: Fata
Morgana, [1935]1982); TA: Le temps et l’autre
(Paris: PUF, [1947]1998); DEHH: En découvrant
l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin
[1967]1998); TI: Totalité et infini: Essai sur
l’extériorité (Paris: Kluwer Academic, [1961]
1998); HH: Humanisme de l’autre homme
(Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1972); DL: Difficile
Liberté: Essais sur le judaisme (Paris: Albin Michel,
1976); AE: Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de
l’essence (Dortrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, [1974]
1986); EI: Éthique et infini (Paris: Fayard, 1982);
DVI: De Dieu qui vient à l’idée (Paris: Vrin, [1982]
1992); AS: Autrement que savoir (Paris: Editions
Osiris, 1988); HN: A l’heure des nations (Paris:
Minuit, 1988); EN: Entre nous: Essais sur le penser-
à-l’autre (Paris: Grasset, 1991); DMT: Dieu, la mort
et le temps (Paris: Grasset, 1993); IH: Les imprévus
de l’histoire (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1994); LC:
Liberté et commandement (Montpellier: Fata
Morgana, 1994); AT: Altérité et transcendance
(Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1995).
2. Lawrence Vogel, “Jewish Philosophies after
Heidegger: Levinas and Jonas on responsibility,” in
W. Davis, ed., Taking Responsibility: Comparative
Perspectives (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 2001), 121–48, hugely exaggerates, not so
much the Jewishness of the two philosophers, nor the
fact that their philosophy bears traces of their per-
sonal religious convictions, but the Judaic—in other
words, the theological, confessional—quality of
their philosophy. According to him, Jonas and
Levinas both have a “distinctively Judaic philoso-
phy”, by which he means “a philosophy that articu-
lates one’s Jewish faith and so includes theological
reflection and affirmation” (122). He goes so far as to
suggest that Jonas and Levinas would dispute ele-
ments of each other’s philosophy on the basis of their
fidelity to articles of Jewish faith (141). The result is,
in my opinion, a markedly distorted presentation of
both philosophers. The essence of this presentation
can be summarized by saying that, according to
Vogel, what they argue for by the exclusive means of
philosophical discourse is just a bonus by which non-
Jews can be brought “into the orbit of Judaic experi-
ence” (139–40). One example will suffice to illus-
trate my point: Vogel claims that “Levinas’s
phenomenological turn brings all humans into the or-
bit of Judaic experience because the I/You encounter,
constitutive of being a human agent, bears pre-philo-
sophical and even pre-textual testimony to the Judaic
understanding of the relationship between humanity
and God” (139–40)—indeed, it is so important to
Vogel to identify Levinas as a Jewish philosopher
that he turns Levinas’s philosophy upside-down: the
face of the other becomes a testimony to Judaism, in-
stead of Judaism’s being one amongst many possible
testimonies of an ethical appeal coming from the
other. It would be prudent to consider The Phenome-
non of Life, where Jonas qualifies the expression “the
secular philosopher” as “a redundant expression”
(245); likewise, I think Levinas should be taken seri-
ously when he explains: “I always make a clear dis-
tinction in what I write between the confessional and
the philosophical texts. I don’t deny that there could
in fact be a source of common inspiration. I only
claim that it is necessary to draw a line of demarca-
tion between the two as having distinct methods of
exegesis and separate languages” (my translation).
“De la phénoménologie à l’éthique” (Interview with
Richard Kearney), Esprit 234 (1997): 121–40.
A much more sophisticated approach is to be found
in Walter Lesch’s “Ethische Argumentation im
jüdischen Kontext: Zum Verständnis von Ethik bei
Emmanuel Levinas und Hans Jonas,” Freiburger
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 38/
3 (1991): 443–69. He explains his approach as fol-
lows: “Es kann nicht darum gehen, ihrer
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unmißverständlichen philosophischen Identität um
jeden Preis eine religiöse Dimension entlocken zu
wollen. Ich möchte lediglich der Frage nachgehen,
inwieweit der Kontext jüdischer Erfahrung, der mehr
umfaßt als eine religiöse Sozialisation, den Text des
ethischen Argumentierens beim Entdecken und
Begründen von Werten beeinflußt”(445). Hence, he
suggests a non-confessional-religious frame of inter-
pretation (cf. 445). In this way he arrives at a per-
spective on Jonas and Levinas that differs consider-
ably from Vogel’s: “Wir sind von der Frage nach dem
jüdischen Kontext ausgegangen und haben gesehen,
daß dieser in Jonas’ Ethik völlig verschwindet und
durch eine metaphysische Ethik ersetzt wird. Aber
auch Levinas versteht sich primär als Philosoph,
kritisiert allerdings den herrschenden Diskurs der
abendländischen Philosophie, die er durch eine
neuartige ethische Sprache überwindet” (467). I at-
tempted to give an account of the complicated rela-
tion between both these philosophers and their iden-
tifiable theological texts in “Responsibility in an Era
of Modern Technology and Nihilism, Part 1. A Non-
Foundational Rereading of Jonas,” Dialogue
48 (2009): 577–99, and in “Giving Up Your Place in
History: The ‘Position’of Levinas in Philosophy and
Jewish Thought,” Journal for Semitics 16 (2007):
180–93.
3. Jonas declared: “Although I cannot and may not for-
get what is between us—it remains that you
[Heidegger] have been my decisive teacher and that
you have never ceased to be a source of philosophical
inspiration for me” (translated from the citation of
Jacques Taminiaux in “Les enjeux d’une lecture
gnost ique de Sein und Zeit ,” in Sil lages
phénoménologiques: Auditeurs et lecteurs de
Heidegger [Bruxelles/Paris: Ousia, 2002], 134). For
Levinas, Sein und Zeit is one of the most beautiful
books in the history of Western philosophy (Éthique
et infini, 27) and he describes his own work as spring-
ing from an “incessant attention to Sein und Zeit”
(Totalité et infini, I).
4. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max
Niemeyer Verlag, [1927]1993), especially §63.
5. For an exposition of Heidegger’s “pragmatism”, cf.
Carl Friedrich Gethmann, “Heideggers Konzeption
des Handelns in Sein und Zeit,” in Heidegger und die
praktische Philosophie, ed. Annemarie Gethmann-
Siefert and Otto Pöggeler (Frankfurt-am-Main:
Suhrkamp, 1988), 140–76.
6. Héctor Mandrioni has adopted a different strategy of
comparison between Jonas, Levinas and Heidegger.
“Responsabilidad y temporalidad,” Escritos de
Filosofia 14 (1995): 43–67. Instead of using Jonas
and Levinas’s indebtedness to Heidegger as his point
of departure, he juxtaposes the philosophies of all
three in order to gain clarity on the semantic tension
between a “logic of free initiative” and a “logic of
obedience” in the notion of “responsibility”. He thus
arrives at a complex five-fold comparison of the
three authors, covering, first, the passivity of the sub-
ject in the imposition of responsibility; second, a
comparison of the relation between being and re-
sponsibility in all three philosophers; third, the simi-
larity of responsibility as constituted by an appeal;
fourth, an indication of the relation between the indi-
vidual’s freedom and the locus of initiative in action;
and, fifth, a schematization of the temporality of re-
sponsibility in which Levinas’s accent is on the im-
memorial past, Heidegger’s is argued to be on the
present, and Jonas’s is directed at the future.
7. Both Jonas and Levinas identify nihilism or the death
of God with Heidegger’s philosophy (The Phenome-
non of Life, ch. 9; Humanisme de l’autre homme, ch.
1). For Heidegger’s “paganism,” cf. PL 249 (Jonas)
and En découvrant l’existence, 171 (Levinas). On
the link between Heidegger’s philosophy and fate,
cf. The Phenomenon of Life, 245, and the entire De
l’évasion (implicitly) and De Dieu qui vient à l’idée,
147.
8. PL 233.
9. Ibid., ch. 9.
10. For what follows, see “Contemporary problems in
ethics from a Jewish perspective” (Philosophical Es-
says, ch. 8).
11. One can find important points of convergence be-
tween Jonas’s sketch of secularisation and Levinas’s
notion of secularisation (as discussed briefly below).
12. For a detailed commentary on the unfolding of
Levinas’s philosophical problem in these two essays,
see Chapter 5, §1, of my Political Responsibility for
a Globalised World: After Levinas’ Humanism
(Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011).
13. De Dieu qui vient à l’idée, 85. For these two forms of
fiasco, see “De la déficience sans souci au sens nou-
veau” (ibid., 77–89) and my commentary on it in De
l’éthique à la justice: Langage et politique dans la
philosophie de Lévinas (Phaenomenologica 183)
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 351–55.
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14. For an extended discussion of this problem, see
Chapter 5 of my Political Responsibility for a
Globalised World. If one were to write a comparison
of Jonas and Levinas’s ideas of the God of religion,
one would have to note that the death or, at least, the
withdrawal of God plays a very important role for
them. Negatively, Auschwitz (and what it stands for)
marks a rupture with preceding forms of theology
(Jonas: “für den Juden . . . ist Gott eminent der Herr
der Geschichte, und da stellt ‘Auschwitz’ selbst für
den Gläubigen den ganzen überl iefer ten
Gottesbegriff in Frage” (Philosophische
Untersuchungen, 193); Levinas: “Ce Dieu a encore
une voix. Il parle avec une voix muette, et cette pa-
role est écoutée. Mais ce Dieu est le Dieu mort de
Nietzsche. Il s’est suicidé à Auschwitz.” “Visage et
violence première,” interview in La différence
comme non-indifférence: Ethique et altérité chez
Emmanuel Lévinas (Paris: Kimé, 1995), 129–43.
This is attested to in the theological aspect or impli-
cations of Jonas’s essay on “Der Gottesbegriff nach
Auschwitz” (Philosophische Untersuchungen,
190–208, which cannot be viewed as a purely theo-
logical text) and, for instance, in Levinas’s
“Judaïsme et kénose” (A l’heure des nations,
133–51). In the latter, Levinas believes there is wis-
dom to be found “after the Shoah” (140), by arguing
that one of the primordial meanings of “kenosis” can
be found in the following idea: “Plus importante que
la toute-puissance de Dieu est la subordination de
cette puissance au consentment éthique de l’homme”
(145), by which is meant, “Dieu a subordonné son
efficacité . . . à mon mérite et démérite; mais ainsi
précisément Dieu ne règne que par l’entremise d’un
ordre éthique, là où un être répond d’un autre” (145).
The God referred to here also suffers in the suffering
of people (149). In Richard Bernstein’s comparison
of Jonas and Levinas’s philosophy on the theme of
evil, Auschwitz is correctly indicated as “evil exem-
plified” and thus as a concrete manifestation of the
problem of nihilism. See Radical Evil: A Philosophi-
cal Interrogation (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 185.
After two separate chapters on Levinas and Jonas, a
short comparison is given on pp. 201-204. It is from
this problem that the question concerning responsi-
bility develops for both authors. I shall come back to
the detail of Bernstein’s comparison.
15. “In der Zielstrebigkeit als solcher . . . können wir eine
grundsätzliche Selbstbejahung des Seins sehen, die
es absolut als das Bessere gegenüber dem Nichtsein
setzt. . . . die bloße Tatsache, daß das Sein nicht indif-
ferent gegen sich selbst ist, macht seine Differenz
vom Nichtsein zum Grundwert aller Werte, zum
ersten Ja überhaupt” (Das Prinzip Verantwortung,
155).
16. For the way in which Jonas opposes Heidegger by
means of this philosophy of nature, see Jacques
Taminiaux, The Metamorphoses of Phenomen-
ological Reduction (Milwaukee: Marquette Univer-
sity Press, 2004), 49–50.
17. Again see ibid., 50–56, for Levinas’s opposition to
the “implied disembodiment” (49) of Heidegger’s
notion of authentic care. (However, Taminiaux bases
his remarks on Levinas’s early phenomenology of
the body, whereas the phenomenology of ageing co-
mes from his later philosophy.) Taminiaux’s text
does not do much more than to juxtapose Jonas and
Levinas, but deserves mention, because it contains a
rare attempt to establish a connection between the
methodologies of the two philosophers.
18. In fact, in Jonas’s insistence on the self-affirmation of
life, i.e., “Daß es dem Sein um etwas geht” (Das
Prinzip Verantwortung, 156), Levinas would hear an
echo of the Heideggerian conviction that “das Sein
ist es, darum es diesem Seienden je selbst geht”
(Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 42), which lies at the heart
of Levinas’s objection to Heidegger’s ontology. Cf.
Levinas’s “Post-scriptum,” in Quelques réflexions
sur la philosophie de l’hitlérisme (Paris: Rivages,
1997), 25.
19. In a rare attempt to lessen the opposition between the
two authors on the relation between ontology and
ethics, Bernstein suggests that “in Levinasian termi-
nology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a
way of understanding ontology and the living body
that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the
other [as Levinas does—EW]” (Radical Evil, 191).
However, he does not develop this idea, and it is not
clear how this could be done, especially since he also
recognizes that it “is disingenuous to try to smooth
out their differences and underestimate their con-
flicting – and at times contradictory—claims” (201).
Consequently, he develops this contrast between the
two authors and here one has to agree with him.
Looking from the side of Jonas’s perspective,
Bernstein argues that “Jonas would never accept
Levinas’s deep skepticism regarding the philosophi-
cal enterprise of ontology” (201–02). An evolution-
ary approach to ontology such as Jonas’s allows both
continuity and difference to be taken into account,
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rather than simply abandoning ontology en gros to
the criticism of totality (202). Jonas may have de-
tected “the vestiges of a type of dualistic thinking”
(202) in Levinas’s ideas concerning the way in which
ethics breaks with being. Contrary to Jonas, Levinas
never awards anything more than a marginal position
to the protection of nature (202). Also, Levinas does
not reflect on the issue of the manner in which mod-
ern technology has changed the nature of human ac-
tion. However, from a Levinasian perspective,
Bernstein estimates that Jonas, unlike Levinas, “co-
mes close to neglecting the particularity and con-
creteness of the ethical relation”, in particular with
our contemporaries (202–03). This remark does,
however, seem to lose some of its validity when one
notes the distinction in Jonas’s philosophy between
responsibility as ethicity, and responsibility as a
foundational rule—responsibility as a foundational
rule is an appropriate additional ethics for our era of
advanced technology, but cannot claim to be appro-
priate in addressing all ethical problems (for more
detail on this duality of Jonas’s ethics of responsibil-
ity, see my “Responsibility in an Era of Modern
Techology and Nihilism, Part 2: Inter-connection
and Implications of the Two Notions of Responsibil-
ity in Jonas,” Dialogue 48 (2009), 841–66, espe-
cially §4.
20. In Evaldo Kuiava’s article “A responsabilidade como
princípio ético em H. Jonas e E. Levinas: uma
aproximação,” Veritas 51 (June 2006): 55–60, the
commentator takes as a point of orientation the fact
that for Jonas and Levinas, responsibility is not only
the central notion of their ethics, but also the begin-
ning of ethics itself or the “principle of ethics” (56).
According to Kuiava, philosophy traditionally pre-
sented free choice as the condition for responsibility
and considered responsibility as something derived
from liberty, but he argues that freedom needs re-
sponsibility as a challenge through which to affirm
itself. Liberty affirms itself through the choice of
moral principles by which it directs itself in specific
contexts. The validity of the principles adopted in
this way is in turn subject to social dispute. Hence,
the need for those in public office to answer for their
decisions with recourse to the common good. It is at
this point that the work of Levinas and Jonas be-
comes relevant. Jonas’s notion of responsibility for
the continued existence of humanity, expressed in his
reformulation of the categorical imperative, de-
mands a change in perspective for those in positions
of power: power should be exercised “for the other,”
rather than “over the other” (58). This is not a respon-
sibility exercised individually, but by the holders of
responsibility in consultation with technical and le-
gal experts for the well-being of everybody, and in
particular in projects of social justice. From this per-
spective, responsibility is the condition for the possi-
bility of returning to a just freedom; it is social justice
that justifies freedom (58). Defending this perspec-
tive is, according to Kuiava’s interpretation, equally
the task that Levinas set himself. For Levinas, the
subject, rationality and all, is so much structured by
this ethical condition, and responsible to such an ex-
tent, that he/she has to live as if he/she does not be-
long to the domain of being, which means, in Socra-
tes’s terms, that it is better to suffer injustice than to
commit it. For Kuiava, in the political domain, this
implies that the holders of power act under the con-
trol of the citizens and in service of their control (59).
Whereas I find the argument about justice in Levinas
unconvincing, I agree with Kuiava’s insistence on
the original position of responsibility that finally
calls for justice.
21. See especially Philosophische Untersuchungen, ch.
6. Hans Achterhuis pointed out this doubt expressed
by Jonas with regard to his earlier undertaking in
“Hans Jonas: ethiek en techniek,” in De maat van de
techniek, ed. H. Achterhuis (Baarn: Ambo, 1992),
164–65.
22. This argument has been developed in detail in my ar-
ticle, “Responsibility in an Era of Modern Technol-
ogy and Nihilism, Part 1: A Non-Foundational Re-
reading of Jonas,” 577–99.
23. “. . . kommt die Gottheit zur Erfahrung ihrer selbst”
(Philosophische Untersuchungen, 195).
24. This aesthetic working of Jonas’s myth has been ana-
lyzed very convincingly by Albrecht Wellmer, “Der
Mythos vom leidenden und werdenden Gott: Fragen
an Hans Jonas,” in Endspiele: Die unversöhnliche
Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993),
250-256, especially 252.
25. “Daß Menschen potentiell schon ‘moralische Wesen’
sind, weil sie diese Affizierbarkeit besitzen, und nur
dadurch auch moralisch sein können” (Das Prinzip
Verantwortung, 164). It is by this affectability that
agents of responsibility “capture” God’s “shadow
and light of disapproval and approval” of which there
is question in Jonas’s myth. Note that the attestation
of human morality by the capacity of being
affectable is also part of Jonas’s myth and of his
metaphysics proper.
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26. Cf. also Jonas’s intervention in “Vom Profit zur Ethik
und zurück: Technik-Verantwortung im
Unternehmen” (Hans Jonas in conversation with
Walther Zimmerli et al.), in Ethik für die Zukunft: Im
Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, ed. D. Böhler and I. Hoppe
(München: C. H. Beck, 1994), 241.
27. That there are in fact two kinds of fear at work in
Jonas’s texts, is not immediately clear—I have ar-
gued for it in §3 of “Responsibility in an era of mod-
ern technology and nihilism, Part 2.”
30. “Gerade die Andersheit nimmt von meiner
Verantwortung Besitz, und keine Aneignung ist hier
intendiert” (Das Prinzip Verantwortung, 166).
29. However, not all ethical relations in Jonas are charac-
terized by asymmetry: asymmetry is typical of pro-
spective responsibility. Given this qualification, one
could contradict Bernstein’s observation that the
fundamental Levinasian theme of “an asymmetrical,
nonreciprocal relation to the other . . . [is] foreign to
Jonas’s philosophical thinking” (Radical Evil,184).
30. If Levinas’s “God” is otherwise than being (cf.
Autrement qu’être, x), Jonas’s God—at least accord-
ing to his myth—has abandoned his/her being to cre-
ation. However, although an independent existence
is denied for God in both cases, God still has an enig-
matic manner of “speaking”: by being in the trace of
the other (Levinas) or by letting light and shadow of
judgment fall on people (Jonas). The theological in-
spiration of these ideas of a commanding but fragile
God (in Jonas, but with some remarks comparing
Jonas’s views with those of Levinas) has been com-
mented on by Caterina Rea in “Retrait de Dieu et
question du mal: Une lecture éthique du mythe de
Hans Jonas,” Revue philosophique de Louvain
100 (2002):, 535–45. Let it be mentioned here that
the “methodology” of imagination adopted by Jonas
in creating his myth is not completely absent from
Levinas’s work. His “phenomenological” descrip-
tions of the “there is” (il y a) depend on a fictive
phenomenological reduction (fictive, since, by
means of this procedure, the very phenomenologist
is also placed in parenthesis). In both cases, the fic-
tion serves to suggest a narrative glimpse on the larg-
est horizon or primal mood in which the diagnosis of
historical developments and the ethical response to it
can be argued to make sense. For Jonas, see my essay
“Responsibility in an Era of Modern Technology and
Nihilism, Part 1,” 589–90; for Levinas and the “re-
duction by imagination”, see my De l’éthique à la
justice, 49–52.
31. On the different understandings of the scope and per-
spective of responsibility in Jonas and Levinas, see
Walter Lesch, “Ethische Argumentation im
jüdischen Kontext: Zum Verständnis von Ethik bei
Emmanuel Levinas und Hans Jonas,” 460–62.
32. It is possible to demonstrate that in fact there is not
one philosophy of responsibility, but two different
philosophies of responsibility in Jonas—one is
ethicity as such and the other is a more particular eth-
ics for a specific era of human history, as I have tried
to do in §4 of “Responsibility in an Era of Modern
Technology and Nihilism, Part 2.”An attempt to con-
trast Jonas’s ontologically founded ethics with
Levinas’s, which draws on the “otherwise than be-
ing,” was made by Wendy Hablet in “To Being or Not
To Being? That is the Question of Ethics,” Analecta
Husserliana 84 (2005): 357–64. Unfortunately, be-
cause this essay is an unsophisticated simplification
of these two philosophies and the relation between
them, it does not make a convincing contribution to
the field of enquiry.
33. Micha Werner, “Dimensionen der Verantwortung:
Ein Werkstattbericht zur Zukunftsethik von Hans
Jonas,” in Ethik für die Zukunft: Im Diskurs mit Hans
Jonas, 311.
34. This is not the place to go into the complexity of this
problem. It has been discussed by Paul Ricoeur in
“Le concept de responsabilité: Essai d’analyse
sémantique,” in Le juste 1 (Paris: Edition Esprit,
1995), 41–70.
35. A number of contributions to this question have al-
ready been made. Zygmunt Bauman, “Morality Be-
gins at Home: Or the Rocky Road to Justice,” in
Postmodernity and its Discontents (New York: New
York University Press, 1997), 46–70, recognizes that
Levinas does not pay much attention to the processes
by which individual ethical responsibility has to find
its generalized realization in the State and its institu-
tions (52). This is regrettable, according to Bauman,
since these institutions sometimes have to act coun-
ter to the demands of ethics. According to Bauman,
Jonas, with his historical perspective, is much more
useful and complements Levinas in this domain.
Central to the merit of Jonas in this regard is the guid-
ing help that the heuristics of fear and the primacy of
the prophecy of doom over the prophecy of success
give in a context of normative uncertainty. Bauman’s
criticism of Jonas is unfortunately based on a ratio-
nalist reduction of the heuristics of fear (leading him
to conclude, for instance, that there would be no
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room in this heuristic process for the unanticipated
consequences of human action, for actions left out of
the heuristic process or that would have been left out
of consideration at the time of action; Bauman also
ignores Jonas’s political realism (cf. 55 with Das
Prinzip Verantwortung, chp 2, §8). Bauman argues
that the current state of the world is due to “the in-
creasingly deregulated market forces, exempt from
all effective political control and guided solely by the
pressures of competitiveness” (56), which makes
ethical demands inaudible—and this agrees with the
spirit of Jonas’s diagnostic of the technological era.
Bauman considers Jonas’s heuristics of fear to be in-
sufficiently demanding for “the macro-ethical exten-
sion of moral responsibility for the Other” (but seems
not to give adequate attention to the full depth of
Jonas’s argument for responsibility as ethicity).
Baumann then turns back to Levinas, who recog-
nises the “demandingness” of the macro-ethical con-
text that would be situated in the quest for ever-im-
proving justice (and not merely in defending
humanity against shared dangers, as Jonas appar-
ently argues). The moral sensitivity needed to re-
spond to this macro-demand is acquired in the micro-
context of the relation to the nearby other (69–70).
In “Thinking Educational Ethics with Levinas and
Jonas,” in Levinas and Education: At the Intersection
of Faith and Reason, ed. D. Egéa-Kuehne (New
York: Routledge, 2008), 150–69, Eirick Prairat pre-
pared an outline of an ethics for educators by exam-
ining the notion of responsibility in Levinas and
Jonas, and in particular the manner in which this no-
tion applies to the educational situation. This issue,
which is intimately associated with the existence of
the modern State and the integration of its citizens
into the State by means of major institutions, seems
to me to be of central importance for the question of
ethics, politics, and justice. Prairat advocates that ed-
ucators should take up their responsibility, which he
understands as solicitude, and as based on an asym-
metrical relation, following Levinas, that proceeds
from the face of the other and that obliges the subject
to responsibility. This is a responsibility not for the
self, but for the other, before any action that is to be
answered for. Despite his different starting point,
Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility “resonates”
(161) with that of Levinas. Based on the urgency to
rethink ethical agency in the era of modern technol-
ogy, Prairat stresses the disinterested fear of Jonas’s
heuristics of fear as a means of access to what is frag-
ile and what is at stake and the realization of this fra-
gility reveals the imperative for humanity to be:
“Jonas introduces the concern about consequences
and distant future; he precisely sets the ignorance
about the ultimate effects of our actions as the very
reason for responsible restraint. Beyond this dimen-
sion of consequence, it is the theme of the ‘heuristics
of fear’we would like to retain because it helps us un-
derstand how the call of the Other can truly mobilize
me and in which sense it calls me to responsibility”
(163). For education, this would entail that responsi-
bility would not be seen as a duty (i.e. as the inverse
of a right), but rather as a solicitation to support a be-
ing that is incomplete, and is to become (i.e. the stu-
dent). Accompanying this what-is-to-be makes re-
sponsibility an “ethics of commitment” (164).
However, Prairat is steadily led into a position of ten-
sion: whereas he presents a plea for solicitude, hospi-
tality, as independent of a particular milieu, he un-
derstands the need to critically limit educational
responsibility institutionally (unlike Levinas) (165).
Prairat devises a way to address this tension between
“scholastic obligation” and “educational hospital-
ity,” namely, considering educational hospitality as
infusing scholastic obligation with its true meaning:
“Solicitude is a kind of virtual factor which accom-
panies our deliberations” (166), in a context, educa-
tion, marked by uncertainty.
In his research proposal, published as “L’Europe et
l’infini,” in Livraison et deliverance: Théâtre,
politique et philosophie (Paris: Belin, 2009),
319–28, Denis Guénoun suggests that the philoso-
phies of Levinas and Jonas could be used to explore
the question concerning “Europe as the place in
which a teleology of the infinite is invented and
through which it flows,” and that serves as a point of
departure from whence to explore the “movement of
auto-production of the universal” in Europe and the
whole world (319). In the tense space of debate be-
tween Jonas and Levinas, both recognize the open-
ing up of the transcendence of the good within being.
The good is the opening that beckons towards the in-
finite. Unfortunately, Guénoun’s text does not de-
velop beyond a sketch of a hypothesis, and it is not
clear whether his approach would help us to under-
stand the relation between ethics and justice in the
work of Jonas and Levinas.
A very different approach in comparing Levinas
and Jonas on responsibility has been developed by
Michelini. His approach is guided by his support for
Apel’s discourse ethics. However, one does not have
to accept this conviction in order to appreciate the
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very insightful manner in which he situates Jonas
and Levinas between Weber and Apel, especially on
the questions pertaining to the foundation of a re-
sponsibility that would be capable of answering for
the consequences of action and that, through the dis-
cursive practice associated with it, enforces the pos-
sibility of practical and institutional deployment.
Since the detailed argument of this article does not
lend itself to a cursory overview, I strongly recom-
mend the reader to consult Dorando Michelini,
“Ética de la responsabilidad: Modelos de
fondamentación y application,” Concordia
41 (2002), 83–103. For points of comparison that are
more closely related to a religious perspective on re-
sponsibility, cf. Lesch “Ethische Argumentation im
jüdischen Kontext,” 468–69.
36. “Pour moi, l’élément négatif, l’élément de violence
dans l’État, dans la hiérarchie, apparaît même
lorsque la hiérarchie fonctionne parfaitement,
lorsque tout le monde se plie aux idées universelles”
(Liberté et commandement, 97).
37. However, the short book Macht oder Ohnmacht der
Subjektivität: Das Leib-Seele-Problem im Vorfeld
des Prinzips Verantwortung (Frankfurt-am-Main:
Insel Verlag, 1981) makes a contribution to a re-
sponse on this issue.
38. I have developed this point further in §1 of “Respon-
sibility in an Era of Modern Technology and Nihil-
ism, Part 2.”
39. Cf. “Transcendance, idolâtrie et secularization,” in
Dieu, la mort et le temps, 190–94.
40. For a discussion of Levinas’s “political theology,”
see §5 of my essay “The State and Politics in a Post-
Colonial, Global Order: Reconstruction and Criti-
cism of a Levinasian Perspective,” SA Publiekreg/
Public Law 24 (2009): 352–69.
41. Cf. Levinas’s phenomenology of the residence
(demeure) in Totalité et infini, 162–90.
42. It is not correct to claim that Levinas’s reflection on
technology is limited to “Heidegger, Gagarin et
nous” (Difficile Liberté, 323–27). See Adriaan
Peperzak, “Technology and Nature,” in Beyond: The
Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1997), 131–144. A more
comprehensive discussion is presented in my De
l’éthique à la justice, 142–47 (in which the claims
made in the current paragraph are worked out in de-
tail).
43. And if individual self-sacrifice is a form of affirma-
tion of being, it is so only because it could be a justifi-
able affirmation of the being of others (cf. Das
Prinzip Verantwortung, 97).
44. Cf. Karl-Otto Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung:
Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionel-
len Moral (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1988),
especially chapter 6: “Verantwortung heute—nur
noch Prinzip der Bewahrung und Selbstbeschrän-
kung oder immer noch der Befreiung und Verwirk-
lichung von Humanität?” 179–216.
45. Cf. Jean-François Lyotard, Le différend (Paris:
Minuit, 1983), especially “Notice Lévinas,” 163–67.
